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An agent-based model to explore a pluralism of land regulation in rural Sahel: 
supplementary data 
 
Hermine PAPAZIAN (PhD Student, CIRAD, UPR Green) 
1. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
i. Purpose 
The purpose of the model is to support the exploration of a stakeholder-oriented pluralism of 
regulation regarding the use and management of Sahelian natural resources. The agent-based model 
simulates the diverse decision-making processes (i.e. the logics of action) of different land actors (users 
and regulators) when they interact for the access and the use of land and water in a Sahelian 
environmental context. The outputs of the model result from the simultaneous implementation of the 
diverse individual decision-making processes.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of the entities’ interactions 
 
To help formalize these uncertain, flexible logics, we performed a direct conceptualisation of the 
stakeholders' points of view, respecting their perception of the different sources of regulation that can 
be used according to their own decisions. The model is therefore focused on actors’ perceptions, which 
2 
 
means it takes into account every land regulation sources that the actors recognize and use, regardless 
of whether or not these sources are legally recognized. This is in a way a stakeholder-oriented 
conceptualization framework.  
In this regard, in much of the Sahel, land, natural resources and water official regulations have evolved 
with very little coordination, and often in different directions. But from the Sahelian actors’ 
perceptions, these different resources are still closely embedded and it is the inseparable association 
of it that allows them to realize their activities and to produce the food they need.  In order to condense 
the analysis of this complex reality and try to preserve the stakeholders’ perceptions, water is 
considered in this study as one of the Sahelian natural resources. Even if the focus is made on land, the 
same reasoning applies to water sources and their regulators as the one developed below for land 
regulators and their territories. We consider in this study the term “land” as the gathering of all natural 
resources from which a user can request access1.  
ii. Case study of Senegal, a Sahelian country 
 
The modelled conceptual framework result from a combination between a bibliographical review, and 
a field experience through two regional case studies in Senegal, a Sahelian country. The field 
experience was conducted in two parts:  
- between April 2011 and June 2013 we conducted three hundred individual semi-structured 
interviews within two rural areas in Senegal (Ferlo sylvo-pastoral area and the developed part 
(mostly irrigated) of the river Senegal valley) considered representing national diversity in 
terms of issues, tensions and uses that can be made of the land. The two zones differ in their 
degree of integration of intensive farming, accompanied by a more pronounced appearance 
of official sources of land tenure regulation in the users' practices for access to land; 
- in April 2014, a role-playing game was realized and experimented in these two rural areas to 
test the reality and conditions of the local mobilization and use of the different sources of land 
tenure regulation. Two participating workshops, each with 20 players (5 players per board) 
were set up in the villages of Sinthiou Bamambé in the Ferlo sylvo-pastoral area and Guia, in 
the the river Senegal valley.  
 
a. The Sahelian environmental context 
The Sahelian zone is characterized by extreme ecological and climatic spatial variability and 
uncertainty. The climate is dry and the rains and temperatures are unpredictable, as highlighted by 
extremely localized differences in their temporal and spatial distribution. The rainfall quantity varies 
strongly not only from one year to the next but also over the same year from a land plot to another. 
Consequently, the level of available resources (such as soil fertility, fodder, non-timber forest products 
(NTFP)…) vary widely according to the rainfall local context.  This ecological variability is also 
geographical, given the topography and fertility of the soils. Overall, this leads to a very dispersed, 
heterogeneous and unpredictable distribution of environmental conditions over the years and within 
a given year.  
b. Regulation of the Sahelian natural resources  
 
                                                          
1 All in all, the land resource can cover the flora, the fauna, and the hydraulic systems as long as they are 
associated to a space of land (de Zeeuw, 1995). 
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Sahelian inhabitants, who have evolved for centuries in this setting of extreme variability and 
uncertainty, have forged territory management rules tailored to this uncertainty and scarcity of 
resources (Ellis et al. 1988, Mehta et al. 1999).. 
First, with land rules and a social organization conducive to high mobility of people and activities 
(especially pastoral transhumance) (Behnke and Scoones 1992), it is possible to take advantage of the 
best of this variability by searching and exploiting the best environmental conditions where they are 
temporarily located. Natural resources not being available enough on the same land plot, it requires 
users to go fulfill their need of natural resources where they can find some. It is also possible to observe 
on the same land plot multiple different access rights (linked to multiple users).  
Indeed, collective management is preferred over individual appropriation of these resources (Berkes 
et al. 1989, Ostrom 1990), which are too sparse to be appropriated by an individual. The complex rules 
that are implemented aim to allow a maximum of individuals to benefit from access to some of these 
resources. Local rules applied in the Sahel are temporally flexible and dynamic and thus favorable for 
multi-uses (Gallais 1977, Le Roy et al. 1996, Mwangi and Dohrn 2008). Some activities being periodic, 
seasonal, annual, it requires a frequent renewal of the access rights.  
Choices of activity are linked to a flexible resource exploitation system, based on the integration of 
multiple activities (several types of farming combined with several types of breeding, harvesting etc. 
which may require water, and seasonal movements). The logic underlying this exploitation system is 
focused on a diversification of income sources rather than on the practice of a single intensive activity, 
which would be too subject to chance and uncertainty.  
Choices of activity are also linked to the availability of the water resource. Some activities are indeed 
not feasible without water supply (for example any breeding activity which requiring the watering of 
the cattle). Moreover, rural activities are distributed in cropping season, the main representation of 
Sahelian cropping season temporality being the succession of rainy seasons (from June to October) 
and dry seasons (from October to June).  During the rainy season, rain allows any cropping activity 
even if a more permanent access right to a water source (like a drilling, a well, a riverside, a hydro-
agricultural canal…) is not obtained. Conversely, during the dry season, no rural activity is feasible 
without a water supply.    
c. The bundle of rights approach 
In order to describe the multiple forms of rights coexisting within the same area researchers have 
focused on a “bundles of rights” approach (Le Roy 1996, Mehta et al. 1999, Ribot and Peluso 2003,…), 
allowing identification of “operational rights” (dealing with land uses) and “administration rights” 
(dealing with the management of these operational rights, their distribution, conflict settlement, 
sanctions, etc.).  
The “bundles of rights” concept illustrates that there is not one right on the land resources, but 
numerous rights (to use, administer, transfer, etc.), on various resources (land, trees, forest products, 
water etc.), and that these rights may be claimed by various users (individual or collective) and under 
the control of different authorities. A bundle of rights can include: access rights; rights to use; rights to 
earn income from the use; rights to invest in the use; rights to delegate land use temporarily or without 
specific terms, in marketable (rent, sharecropping) or non-marketable terms (loan); the right to pledge; 
and the right to definitively alienate, through a marketable transfer (sale) or donation.  
These land rights can be available all year, or only over a certain period (for example a right to use only 
during the dry or the rainy season) and for a certain duration, from the cropping season up to several 
years (for example, a user can benefit from a right to use a land only for rainy season during all his life). 
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Access rights can be free, or linked to a certain monetary or non-monetary cost (gifts, labor force, 
sharecropping, loan, rent etc.).  
The nature of the land right, what it allows, its cost, its duration, and a set of other criteria help 
constituting a specific perception of land tenure security for each Sahelian user, which conditions his 
choice of rural activity in relation with the act of investment he can consider. Indeed, the perception 
of land tenure security can be affected by the nature (and the need of investment) of the rural activity 
performed (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994). For example, an oral periodic right to use a land only 
during the rainy seasons can be considered safe enough to realize extensive cropping (millet, sorghum, 
maize, fonio…), but not safe enough to start more intensive cropping (groundnut, fruit trees, market 
gardening…). Land tenure security is therefore in this approach considered as a feeling, resulting from 
a dynamic process which changes and adapts itself to the conditions of a given context (Bruce and 
Migot-Adholla 1994, Le Roy 1999, Cotula 2012). 
Besides, even if the focus is made, for the clarity of the analysis, on the consideration of two main 
types of distinct land actors (users and regulators), the boundaries between users and regulators can 
in reality be very fuzzy. When Sahelian users benefit for example from a part of the bundle of rights 
that allow them to delegate their land access right, they become themselves regulators, and can decide 
according to their own logic of action to share their land with other users, through marketable (rent, 
sharecropping) or non-marketable terms (loan).  
This last statement leads to the question of the spatial and social scale of exploration of the 
stakeholder-oriented pluralism of regulation. Whether we consider the regulation or the use of land 
resources, each “collective scale”: a family, a village, a lineage, a local community, an ethnic group, etc. 
can include intra/inter forms of land regulation pluralism, which express itself to the spatial scales of a 
land plot, a farm, a territory village, a rural community, a region, a country… 
d. A stakeholder-oriented pluralism of land regulation sources 
As the land tenure policies set up by states do not recognize the local regulation sources described 
above, they have used approaches to land tenure and ownership that are too different to the local 
context for it to be possible to remove them (Mwangi and Dohrn 2008). The management of land 
resources is therefore built on several overlapping land regulation systems where numerous regulators 
intervene. 
The Senegalese decentralization land policy officially provides a territory management mandate to 
local communities, who deliver land allocations, equivalent to authorisations of use of the land (users 
are usufructers of the land they farm). The central State continues to take part in this management, 
for example by allotting large portions of land through land title (private ownership) often to State 
members or big investors. Moreover, even if local communities are the official designated territorial 
management regulators, the traditional system, as described above, is commonly respected, and 
customary headmen can remain the reference regulators for anything concerning land and natural 
resources (drawing up of rules, land allotments, regulation conflicts).  
This stakeholder-oriented conceptual framework led us to considering the various systems of rules as 
simple 'potential' sources of regulation. The term 'source' carries the idea that users make partial use 
of a set of rules and regulatory authorities with no systemic approach. It is not because a user decides 
at time t to use a particular authority or a particular regulation that he will necessarily adopt the entire 
functioning and logic of the system with which it is associated. Local stakeholders construct their own 
'operation puzzle' by taking pieces for this from the different systems available to them. The puzzle 
changes as time goes by according to experience and local social interactions that modify the 
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legitimacy of one regulation system or another, or rather of such and such a way of drawing a rule 
from a regulation system.  
e. Interactions processes for the management and use of land access rights 
Each regulator of these different land regulation systems has administration rights on a territory, 
representing a portion of the global landscape. Different regulators can have similar, complementary 
or overlapping administration rights on the same territories. During his exercise of administration, a 
regulator has his own perception of the ways he wants to implement the rules and laws on his land 
territory, and acts therefore according to its own logic, which is not necessarily compatible with that 
of other regulators. The focus for allocating resource access rights can for example be made on users’ 
capital, favoring requests of the users with the highest capital or the most intensive activities. But it 
can also be made on users themselves, by adapting access authorizations to the assurance that all the 
users of the regulator territory have resource access rights. The focus for allocating resource access 
rights can also be made on resources environmental state or on customary principles (e.g. primacy to 
the initial establishment, or transmission to the first son) etc. 
Sahelian users also apply their own logics of action, and the various present or past laws are 
interpreted and used—or not used—according to their perceptions. Users seems to mobilise this 
pluralism of land regulation at least partially by following an imitation logic, adapting themselves to 
the prevalent land regulation source (whether it is formal or informal) active in the rural zone where 
is situated the resources for which they require the access. A user who wants to access a resource will 
base his decision on the ways the other users that already exploit the spaces which interest him have 
obtained their own access rights. Another component of a user land tenure security would therefore 
be the recognition by the other users, because this recognition assures him a non-contesting of his 
resource access right(s). This prevalence of a land regulation source could be defined as the source of 
regulation which is the most mobilized by the users of the area already exploiting the concerned 
natural resource. The prevalence is therefore associated with the nature of the rural activity users want 
to realize (because this choice of activity defines the need of natural resource: soil fertility if a user 
wants to farm, fodder if it is a breeder, NTFP if he wants to harvest etc.).  
In the same rural zone, several sources of land regulation can overlap according to the activities (and 
thus the different concerned resources). Some farmers of the area can for example mobilize an official 
instance such as a local community (or the State) in order to obtain a land allocation (or a land title) 
for their land while at the same place and time, pastures for the breeders are still managed by oral 
agreements delivered by customary headmen, with no recognition from the senegalese land law. 
Following these conditions, a new land regulation (like a new land use policy for example) will be really 
effective only in the rural zones where it becomes a way of accessing natural resources settled in the 
practices of the users of the concerned zone.  
The nature of the new land regulations introduced until now by land use policies (land title, land 
allocation, lease…) do not seem to have a value for Sahelian users, they chose to mobilise the new 
regulation in a strategic way, because it seems to constitute their better land tenure security in the 
new land insecurity contexts where their already existing practises are not anymore enough. These 
new sources of land regulation do not initially result from actors practices. Users therefore consider 
these changes with a certain distance, mobilizing them only in the rural zones where their peers have 
already legitimized them in their practices of land access. This legitimization seems more to prevent 
users from the possible effects of these new imposed regulations than to reassure rights susceptible 
to be locally questioned. This could explains why in the rural contexts where official land regulation 
sources have not much influence, traditional land regulations remain a sufficient level of safety for 
users to invest in their rural activities on the only basis of these “customary” informal land rights.   
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f. Adoption of a land regulation change within this stakeholder-oriented pluralism of 
land regulation sources 
All in all, the evolution of the land tenure situation in rural areas in the Sahel thus shows that these 
policies have finally accentuated the existing complexity (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994, Platteau 
1996, Mehta and Leach 1999, Cotula 2012). Indeed, rather than abandoning their practices, local 
populations have added the land tenure policies set up successively to their pre-existing sources of 
regulation. It does cause a certain uncertainty that is difficult to grasp (Metah et al. 1999, Mwangi et 
Dohrn 2008): different stakeholders make therefore claim rights to the same land by referring to 
different regulatory sources.  
The dynamic and diversity of expression of this stakeholder-oriented pluralism of regulation is linked 
to the concept of perception thresholds, above which changes are observed in users’ practices of 
mobilisation of land regulation sources, but below which no matter the nature of the introduced 
change (for example, a new land use policy), it does not seem to be perceived, or in any case 
considered by Sahelian users. 
Changes in land regulation can be introduced through a diversity of intensities (as the proportion of 
users mobilizing this new land regulation source on a same area) and configurations (as the spatial 
distribution of the users mobilizing the new land regulation source). This leads to a diversity of 
landscape composition evolutions at a general scale, according to the introduced changes. For 
example, a new development project can bring changes in land regulation on one or several contigous 
areas (the project works with all the users of a village, of a local community, of a hydro-agricultural 
area…). A new land use policy will however concern all the users of the country, oftenly on a volontary 
basis (users have to launch the process of converting and formalizing their land rights). This approach 
have generally led to a weak foothold of the state in all the Sahelian countries who had initiate it. 
Another example is the one of a (foreign) land investment project, which concerns a few users (mainly 
only the investor(s)) but can have a large impact on the general landscape composition, according to 
the number of hectares concerned by the investment project.  
According to the intensity and the configuration of the introduced change - coupled with a diversity of 
criteria such as the pre-existing perceptions of land tenure security that users of the area(s) concerned 
by the land regulation change have or not - the perception thresholds (and the mobilization of the new 
land regulation in consequence) will vary.  
2. MODELLING THE SYSTEM WITH THE HELP OF THE CORMAS PLATEFORM  
 
The modelled conceptual framework being a direct conceptualization of the stakeholders' points of 
view on this pluralism of land regulation sources, we chose to implement it (in order to explore it) 
within an agent-based model (http://cormas.cirad.fr/). Indeed, whenever it makes sense to take a 
range of actors having different characteristics into account, and to finely represent their interactions 
between one another and with their environment, the multi-agent modelling is an effective solution 
for effectively reporting this complexity (Bousquet, Barreteau et al., 1996; ComMod, 2005). Cormas – 
the platform used for the model construction – was specially developed by CIRAD for simulating 
natural resource management and is oriented towards the representation of interactions between 
stakeholders on natural renewable resource use. It allows to model distinct individual behaviors 
(agents) according to a diversity of logics (e.g. the various perceptions on pre-existing and/or new land 
regulation sources), which bring the agents to opt for different practices according to the context of 




i. General overview of the agent-based model 
 
The agent-based model allows the expression of a plurality of decision-making processes for the 
different social entities of the model: 
- For the regulators, who manage water sources and land territories in which they allocate land 
or water access rights according to different logics of action; 
- Fort the users, who choose activities requiring a need of water and land for which they interact 
with different regulation sources in order to obtain access rights. According to the response of 
regulators, users will finally realize activities and consume the resources of the land plots and 
the water of the water sources for which access rights have been obtained.  
 
Figure 2: UML class diagram of the agent-based model 
ii. Entities of the agent-based model 
a. Spatial entities 
 
The environment of the model represents a typical Sahelian territory composed of spatial entities 
knowns as land plots, which can be of different types: the lowlands, the intermediary sandy areas and 
the degraded lands (define through the attribute “LandType”). Each land plot containing a set of 
attributes on natural resources: fertility, fodder, and non-timber forest products (NTFP). The initial 
quantity of resource is the same of each type of resource on a land plot, but differs from one land plot 
to another according to the nature of the land type (lowlands being the most fertile areas, we find 
more important quantity of resources there).  
This quantity is known through the multiplication of the size of the land plot (known through the land 
plot attribute: landPlotArea) with the value, according to the land type of the land plot, of the 
attributes: “lowlandSoilPerHaInit”, “degradedSoilPerHaInit” and “sandySoilperHaInit”. Indeed, each 
land plot has an attribute defining the area of the land plot. Three choices of value exist for this 
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attribute, linked to three possible scales of land plot: 1 hectare, 50 hectares, or 1000 hectares. The 
quantity of each natural resource on each land plot is then updated after each rural activity which 
consume it (for example if the rural activity is breeding, it will consume the fodder resource) and at 
the beginning of each rainy season where natural resources are partially or totally replenished. 
From an environmental point of view, the fertility of a land plot is considered “high” if the value of its 
attribute “fertility” is higher than one third of the initial fertility quantity.  The value is similarly 
considered “low” if the value of its attribute “fertility” is lower than one third of the initial fertility 
quantity.  
 Each land plot has an attribute “localCommunity”, an attribute “landChiefTerritory” and an attribute 
“Stateplot” that link the land plot respectively to a local community agent, a land chief agent and the 
state agent who are in charge of managing it. The land plots also have a set of attributes regarding the 
evolution of their availability of hectares for the different sources of land regulation: 
“availableHaLandChief”, “availableHaLocalCommunity”, “availableHaState”. These attributes are by 
default equal to the value of the attribute landplotArea, and their values evolve according to the land 
activity of the different regulators who manage the landplot. For example, if a land plot area is equal 
to 50 hectares, and a user receives a right to use on this land plot for 10 hectares from a landChief 
regulator, the attribute “availableHaLandChief” will take the value 50-10 = 40 hectares.  
Each land plot also possesses an attribute “landPlotUsers” which informs the users of who have 
resource access rights on the land plot, and especially from which regulator(s) the different user agents 
obtained those access rights. The attributes “Land Chief Regulation”, “Local Community Regulation”, 
“State Regulation” and “Other User Regulation” of each land plot then inform the modeler (and the 
users) of the general prevalent land regulation source at the scale of the land plot (by adding the 
number of access right delivered by each sources of regulation on the land plot).  
At last, each land plot possesses a set of attributes: “Land Chief update”, “Local Community update”, 
“State update” and “Other User update”. These “update” attributes are by default equal to zero, and 
it is by modifying the value of these attributes that the modeler can introduce changes in the sources 
of land regulation during the simulation. The modification of these values symbolize new (fictive) user 
agents that would access the resources of the land plot through this source of land regulation (the 
state if the modeler modify the state update attribute, the local community if he modify the local 
community update attribute etc.). These “update” attributes are part of the calculation of the 
prevalent land regulation source. Indeed, to define the number of users mobilizing a land regulation 
source at the scale of the land plot, the agent-based model adds the result from the collection 
“LandPlotUsers” to the value of this “update” attribute. For example, if the result of the consultation 
of the collection “landPlotUsers” shows that 10 user agents are exploiting the resources of the land 
plot through land Chief access rights, and that the value of the attribute “landChiefupdate” is 20, the 
total number of users mobilizing the land chief regulation to access resources will be 30 (and the 
attribute “Land Chief Regulation” will be equal to 30).  
b. Passive entities 
Water sources  
 
Various water sources, randomly distributed in the environment, exist in the agent-based model: wells, 
drillings and ponds (define by their attribute “nature”). Wells and drillings are permanent water 
sources, managed by water regulators agents (social entities). These water sources are linked to their 
water regulator through the attribute “waterRegulator”. Ponds are temporary water sources which 
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appear only in the rainy season (the number of ponds created will vary according to the quality of the 
rainfall). Access to the ponds is free, it does not require to negotiate this access with any regulator.  
According to their nature, water sources have different available quantities of water. This value is 
known by the attribute “waterQuantity”, initially equal to the value of the attributes 
“initWaterDrillingQuantity”, “initWaterWellQuantity” or “initWaterPondQuantity” according to the 
nature of the water source. This value is then updated, like the other natural resources, after each 
rural activity which consumes water and at the beginning of each rainy season where water sources 
are partially or totally replenished. 
Activities 
 
According to the amount of capital they possess, user agents can have up to 6 possible choices of 
activity: intensive farming, extensive farming, intensive breeding, extensive breeding, intensive NTFP 
harvesting, and extensive NTFP harvesting. These activities require more or less initial input 
investment, with a more or less important natural resource consumption and finale production in 
consequence. It can be associated with water resource in order to improve the yield of already 
intensive farming or harvesting activities (which become then irrigated intensive activities) (see Table 
1). Water is required for breeding activities (a user agent cannot realize these activities without water), 
or for any rural activity during the dry season (a user agent with no water access right won’t be able to 
realize activities at this period of the year). At last, extensive farming and harvesting activities which 
do not require a more permanent water access are only possible during the rainy season (with the 
rainfall supply). According to the nature of the activity, the nature of the resource consumed on the 
land plot varies: farming activities consume the fertility of the land plot, breeding activities consume 
the fodder and harvesting activities consume the NTFP resources.  
 
Each time a user agent realizes a rural activity, a passive located entity is created on the land plot for 
which the user agent has obtained a resource access right (allowing him to realize this activity). The 
entity Activity is composed of the attributes:  
 
Attribute Definition 
nature Defining the nature of the activity 
user linking the activity to the user agent who realize it 
localization Linking the activity to the land plot on which it is realized 
quantOfHectares Defining the number of hectares of the land plot that the activity 
required 
QuantOfResources Defining the ideal/theoretical quantity of resource (fertility, fodder 
or NTFP according to the nature of the activity) needed for the 
activity 
effectiveQuant Defining the real quantity of resource consumed according to the 
availability of resources on the land plot 
WaterNeeded Defining the ideal/theoretical quantity of water needed for the 
activity 
WaterAvailable Defining the real quantity of water consumed according to the 
availability of water of the water source 
CapitalNeeded Defining the investment needed to realize the activity 
sourceOfReg Defining the source of regulation (the regulator agent) allowing the 
user to realize his activity through the resource access right he 




Table 1: attributes for the calculation of a rural activity cost and level of production 
Activity Initial 
Investment (/ha) 






investMinIntensiveFarming intensiveFertilityConsumptionPerHa farmingWaterPerHa intensiveRate irrigationRate 
Extensive 
Farming 
investMinExtensiveFarming extensiveFertilityConsumptionPerHa  extensiveRate irrigationRate 
Intensive 
Breeding 
investMinIntensiveBreeding intensiveCattleFodderPerHa intensiveCattleWaterPerHa intensiveRate irrigationRate 
Extensive 
Breeding 








investMinExtensiveNTFPHarvesting extensiveGatheringPerHa  extensiveRate irrigationRate 
 
For example, if a user realizes an activity of intensive farming on 3 hectares of a land plot, he will initially deduct from his attribute “capital” the value 
[investMinIntensiveFarming * 3]. He will consume the value: [3* intensiveFertilityConsumptionPerHa] of the fertility of the land plot. If he realizes this intensive 
farming with a water supply, he will also consume the value: [3*farmingWaterPerHa] of the water of the water source for which he has obtained a water 
access right. His final production will be equal to: [3* intensiveFertilityConsumptionPerHa * intensiveRate * irrigation Rate], and will be added to his attribute 
“capital” at the end of the simulation step.  
 
The agent-based model take into account the potential gap between this “ideal”, theoretical scenario of activity and the current state of natural resource and 
water availability. If the quantity of resource on the land plot or on the water source is lower than the user’ expectations, he will consume the maximum 





c. Social entities 
Regulators 
 
From the sub-class Regulator, the agent-based model considers 3 possible classes of regulator agents, 
corresponding to 3 sources of regulation existing within the pluralism of land regulations for securing 
access to resources:  
- the land chief agents, representing the weight of tradition, 
- the local community agents, representing the decentralization policy, 
- the state agent (central as regionalized).  
These regulators represent different rules and laws which exist, or have existed, but which in any case 
make sense for the users who decide to mobilize them. According to the scenarios the modeler decides 
to explore, it is possible to introduce into the model up to all of these potential sources of land 
regulation.  
Each regulator agent (Land Chief, Local Community and State) possesses an attribute 
“resourcesUnderMyRegulation” representing the set of land plots on which he has an administration 
right. He knows the total size of his territory through the attribute “sizeOfterritory” (equal to the 
adding of the number of hectares of each land plot of his attribute “resourcesUnderMyRegulation”). 
For land chief agents, it represents their respective land territories (land plots are linked to their land 
chief regulator agent through their attribute landChiefTerritory), and for local community agents the 
decentralized territories they are mandated to manage (land plots are linked to their local community 
regulator agent through their attribute localCommunity). For the state agent (only one agent of this 
type created), he always manages the whole territory, known as the state domain (the State knows 
and is linked to all the land plot of the agent-based model environment, through their attribute 
“stateplot”). Different regulator agents can have the same land plot to manage on their respective 
territories, in order to illustrate the overlap of land regulation systems.  
Each regulator agent has an attribute “communityOfUsers” allowing him to know the user agents that 
are part of his landChiefTerritory (if the regulator is a land Chief), his local community (if the regulator 
is a local Community) or his state domain (if the regulator is the state). As same as for the land plots, 
the state regulator agent knows all the users of the agent-based model environment, and a same user 
is attached to a landChiefterritory and to a localCommunity (and to the State) at the same time.  
Each regulator agent has an attribute “logic of action” defining the logic he will follow to distribute 
resource access rights on the land plots he manage. This attribute can take the value: #economic, 





Table 2: synopsis of the regulator different logics of action 
Objective Logic of action 
#economic The focus for allocating resource access rights is here made on users’ capital, 
regulator agents favoring requests of the users with the highest capital 
#social The focus for allocating resource access rights is here made on users 
themselves. A regulator agent following this logic will adapt his access 
authorizations to the assurance that all the users of his territory have at least 
one resource access right 
#enviroConserv The focus for allocating resource access rights is here made on the conservation 
of resources environmental state. A regulator agent following this logic will 
close the access to the land plots of his territory where the state of the 
resources is the best to optimize their environmental durability 
#enviroResto The focus for allocating resource access rights is here made on the restauration 
of resources environmental state. A regulator agent following this logic will 
close the access to the land plots of his territory where the state of the 
resources is the worst, to allow their fastest and better reconstruction. 
 
Endowed with his own logic of action, each regulator agent manages for every season the resource 
access rights on the land plots of his territory (see Figure 3). When a regulator agent finally decides to 
give a resource access right on a land plot to a user agent, he gives him an OrderedCollection composed 
of: 
Detail of a 
resource access 
right:  
#social #economic #enviroConserv #enviroResto 
A nature of 
resource access 
right 
Randomly chooses between #rightToUse and #rightToInvestInTheUse.  
 
The agent-based model focuses on these two levels of the bundles of rights 
because it represents two forms of space appropriation already highly 
differentiated, which impact the decision of investment for the users 
A surface, in 
hectares, 
localized on one 
or several land 
plot(s) 
Equal to the value 
of the attribute 
“SocialOptimalSize” 
Equal to the 
value of the user 
request 
Equel to the value of the attribute 
“EnviroOptimalSize” 
A period Randomly chooses between: #drySeason, #rainySeason and #annual 
A duration Randomly chooses between a range of duration (from the season up to several 
years) 
A access price  Equal to the value of the regulator attribute “rentingPriceCommunity” 
 
Note here that when user agents make land right requests to regulator agents, they ask for a defined 
land plot, a defined surface and a defined nature of access right, resulting from the choice of activity 
they are planning to realize. All the user requests are collect and known by a regulator agent through 
his attribute “usersRequests”. According to their own logics of action, regulators will choose to follow 
the users wishes, or decide themselves which land plot will be allocate, for which surface, which period, 
duration, and for what purpose (to use only, or right to invest in the use). All the resource access rights 




Figure 3: activity diagram for a land regulator and details of its different logics of action according to the objective he 
prioritizes 
Choice of logic 
of action 
 
Decide on a unit value 








Look for an 
available 
land plot 




territory size) / 
(number of users 
requests) 
Selects a user from a 
social ranking of the 
user requests, 
prioritizing in the first 
part the ones with no 





all the land 











between a range of unit 
prices 
Follows the users 
wishes in their 
requests 
Selects a user from a 
wealth ranking of the 
user requests 
prioritizing in the first 
part the ones with a 
high amount of 
capital 
#enviroConserv EnviroOptimalSize 
= (Number of land 
plots with low 
fertility) / 
(Number of user 
of the regulator 
community) 
Selects randomly a 













= (Number of land 
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Each water regulator agent created in the agent-based model has in management one water source 
(well or drilling) known through his attribute “WaterSourceUnderRegulation”. As same as for the land 
regulators, he regulates for every season the water access rights on his water source, endowed with 
his own logic of action (see Table 3).   
Table 3: synopsis of the water regulator different logics of action 
Value of the 
attribute 
Logic of action 
#economic The focus for allocating water access rights is here made on users’ capital, 
regulators favoring requests of the users with the highest capital 
#social The focus for allocating water access rights is here made on users themselves. A 
regulator following this logic will adapt his access authorizations to the assurance 
that all the users who have requested a water access from his water source have 
at least one water access right 
#enviro The focus for allocating water access rights is here made on water environmental 
state. The regulator following this logic will close the access to his water source 
when the water level goes below a certain environmental level. 
 
When a water regulator agent decides to distributed a water access right to his water source, this 
access right is constituted: 
- of a certain quantity of water, representing what the user is allowed to take, and define 
according to the water regulator logic of action; 
- for a duration: define by the water regulator attribute “waterRightDuration” 
- at a certain cost, known through the water regulator attribute “waterPrice” and defined by 
the water regulators according to his logic of action.   
As with land regulators, when user agents make water right requests to water regulator agents, they 
ask for a defined water quantity resulting from the choice of activity they are planning to realize. These 
requests are collect through the water regulator attribute “userWaterRequests”. According to their 
own logics of action, water regulators will choose to follow the users’ wishes, or decide themselves 
which water quantity they allow.  All the water access rights delivered by a water regulator agent are 
kept in his attribute: “waterAccessRightsDelivered”. 
For both steps, water regulator agents do a succession of actions for distributing water access rights 
on their water sources, the conditions linked to the realization of these actions depending on the logics 
they choose to follow (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: activity diagram for a water regulator and details of its different logics of action according to the objective he 
prioritizes 
Choice of 
logic of action 
 
Decide on a 
WaterPrice (/unit of 
water) 
Estimate an optimal 





(see Figure 4) 
Allocates only free 
water access right 
(water source total 
quantity of water) / 
(number of users 
requests) 
Selects a user from a 
social ranking of the user 
requests prioritizing first 
the ones with no (or few) 
water access right 
#economic 
(see Figure 5) 
Randomly chooses 
between a range of 
unit prices 
Authorize the quantity 
users request while the 
water source quantity >0 
Selects a user from a 
wealth ranking of the 
user requests prioritizing 
first the ones with a high 
amount of capital 
#enviro 
(see Figure 6) 
 
Authorize the quantity 
the users request while 
the water source quantity 
is higher than one third of 
the initial water source 
quantity (in relation with 
the water source nature) 
Selects a user randomly 
from the user requests 
 
 




Figure 5: activity diagram for a water regulator prioritizing economic objectives 
 




In the agent-based model, three natures of user agent are represented: a rural family, a village or a 
group of villages, according to the scale analysis of the pluralism of land regulation that the modeler 
wants to explore. According to his nature, a user agent will have more or less important values of his 
attributes “collectiveMembers”, “foodSelfSufficiencyThreshold” and “capital” (this attribute 
symbolizes the gathering of the physical capital, the human capital and the financial capital). User 
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agents created are initially randomly localized in the model environment, and by doing so attached to 
a land territory (linked to a land Chief agent through their attribute “landChiefTerritory”), a local 
community (linked to a local community agent through their attribute “localCommunity”), and to the 
state domain (the state agent knows all the users). 
At the beginning of the dry and the rainy seasons (see Figures 7 and 8), user agents start by choosing 
a first potential activity to realize according to their capital. To do so, they look on their attribute 
“libraryOfActivities” to select the most intensive activity they can realize (by comparing the different 
values of initial investment per ha of the activities of the Library with the value of their own capital). 
Then, they ask (if necessary to their activity) for water access rights to the regulator of the water 
sources they perceive. To do so, they look around them according to their individual value of attribute 
“perceptionOfResourceRegulation” (it defines the extent of the water sources they consider) where 
are the water sources which the higher quantity of water, and they send a request to each of the water 
regulator linked to the concerned water sources. Requests of a user agent are collect through his 
attribute “waterAccessRightRequests”. Responses from the water regulators (according to their own 
logics of action) are available through the user attribute “waterAccessRights”. According to these 
responses, user agents will maintain their first choice of activity, or opt for a new one which does not 
require a water supply (this action is possible only during the rainy season, otherwise a user agent with 
no water access rights is not able to realize any rural activity). To do so, they look on their attribute 
“libraryOfActivitiesNoWater”.  
 
The choice of activity will lead to a need of a certain number of hectares to realize it (known by the 
attribute “hectaresNeeded”). This number of hectares is calculated in the agent-based model from the 
operation: [capital of the user / (initial investment per ha of the chosen activity)]. A user agent always 
begins by consulting his portfolio of resource access rights (through his attribute 
“resourceAccessRights”), to know (1) if he already possess available resource access rights, and (2) if 
these rights are suited and/or sufficient (in term of number of hectares for example, or of nature of 
access right) with regard to the activity he decided to realize. If his portfolio of resource access rights 
is empty, unsuitable or simply insufficient, the user agent is going to ask for a new resource access 
right and by doing so enter in interaction with a source of land regulation.  
 
According to the nature of the chosen activity, a need to reach the natural resources (fertility for 
farming, NTFP for harvesting, fodder for breeding) is necessary. Users ask for this access to the 
regulators who manage the resources they request. To do so, they look around them according to the 
individual value of their attribute “perceptionOfResourceRegulation” (it defines the extent of the land 
plots they consider) where are the resources with the higher quantity and they send a request to the 
prevalent land regulator linked to each land plot they have found. This prevalence is known through a 
ranking by the user agent of the values of the land plot attributes: “Land Chief Regulation”, “Local 
Community Regulation”, “State Regulation” and “Other User Regulation”. This action symbolizes the 
fact that a user who wants to access a resource will base his decision on the ways the other users that 
already exploit the spaces which interest him have obtained their own access rights. If no prevalent 
source of regulation emerges from the land plot the user agent needs to access, he will by default 
consider asking for his access right to the land chief agent of the land plot considered. All the requests 
of a user agent to land regulators are collect through his attribute “resourceAccessRightRequests”. 
According to the sources of land regulation mobilized and to the return (favorable or unfavorable) of 
the land regulators, the user agent find himself with a updated portfolio of resource access rights that 
will condition his final activity decision and the consumption of natural resources that results. For 
example, all user agents respect the rule about what the nature of the access right allows them to 
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realize. Intensive activities requiring consequent initial investment are considered only by users with 
rights to invest in the use. Thus if at the end of the interactions with regulators the users find 
themselves with simple rights to use, they will reconsider their choices to opt for extensive activities 
(by looking on their attribute “libraryOfExtensiveActivities”). If a right to invest in the use is obtained, 
user agents will base their final decisions of investment on their attribute 
“perceptionOfAccessRightDuration”, specific to each user agent. For any right to invest in the use, if 
the duration of the access right delivered by the regulator goes below the value of this perception of 
access right duration, the user will consider the act of investment too risky, and will opt for extensive 
activities.  
Part of the production serves to satisfy the food needs of the family, the village or the group of villages 
(according to the nature of the user agent), and the potential surplus is put back in the user capital for 
the following step, or season.  At the end of each season, user agents update their portfolio of resource 
access rights, by removing the rights for which the duration reaches its end.   
 
The last source of land regulation considered in the agent-based model is the inter-users regulation. If 
a user has available hectares to share on his land plot(s) (only for the ones for which the obtained 
access is a right to invest in the use), he can allow access to it to the other users, becoming by doing 
so a regulator. To do so, each user agent possessing rights to invest in the use will compare his own 
need of hectares (through the value of his attribute “hectaresNeeded”) with the total number of 
hectares proposed with his land right. If his need of hectares is lower than the total available number 
of hectares, he will propose the complement to other user agents through his attribute 
“accessRightAvailableToShare”. All the requests from the other users are collect into the attribute 
“otherUserRequests”. 
User-regulators follow the same logics of action as other regulators to define their access permission, 
they can choose between: #economic, #social, #enviroConserv and #enviroResto (known through the 
user attribute “logicOfRegulatorAction”). These logics symbolize the various manners to make land 
circulate between users, through lend (free access), rent (paying access), or through fallow dynamics 
















Table 5: details of a user-regulator different logics of action according to the objective he prioritizes 
Choice of logic 
of action 
 
Decide on a renting Price Estimate an optimal 
quantity of land to 
allocate 
Select a user from the 
otherUserRequests 





Adjusts  the users 
wishes in their 
requests to the 
number of hectares 
available (if the number 
of hectares requested by 
a user is lower than the 
total hectares available, 
the user-regulator will 
follow the user wishes, if 
not, he will give him the 
maximum of hectares 
still available)  
Selects a user from a 
social ranking of the 
other user requests, 
prioritizing in the first 
part the ones with no (or 
few) resource access 
rights 
#economic  
The renting price is 
calculated by the adding 
of the price/ha of the 
initial land right (that the 
user-regulator first 
received) with an 
individual interest rate 
known through the 
attribute “interestRate” 
Selects a user from a 
wealth ranking of the 
other user requests 
prioritizing in the first 
part the ones with a high 
amount of capital 
#enviroConserv  
The renting price is equal 
to the price/ha of the 
initial land right (that the 
user-regulator first 
received) 
Selects randomly a user 






When a user-regulator agent decides to give a resource access right to another user, the access right 
is constituted of the same elements as for the other regulators, but the access right is on his own land 
plot(s), and the duration is only for one step (a seasonal access right). All the land rights distributed by 
a user-regulator to other users are collect through his attribute “accessRightDeliveredToUsers”. 
d. Dynamics of the agent-based model 
Agro-ecological dynamics  
 
Natural resource replenishment is linked to the annual rainfall, which is based on the Sahelian concepts 
of high variability and uncertainty regarding natural resources evolution and availability. In addition to 
the nature of the environment, the quality (good, medium or bad) of the rainfall has an impact on the 
environmental state of fertility, fodder, and NTFP on each land plot.  
At the beginning of each rainy season, the agent-based model randomly chooses the quality of the 
rainfall (defining the value of its class attribute rainfallLevel: #good #medium #bad) with a respective 
probability of 1/6 for the good rainfall, 1/3 for the medium rainfall and ½ for the bad rainfall. According 
to the quality of this rainfall, the number of land plots for which the natural resource are totally 
(highRate attribute) or partially (mediumRate: 50%, lowRate: 25%, or zeroRate: 0% of replenishment) 
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replenished will vary (see Table 6). The rate of replenishment is based on the initial quantity of natural 
resources which differ according to the land type of the land plot (attribute lowlandSoilPerHaInit”, 
“degradedSoilPerHaInit” or “sandySoilperHaInit).  
 
For example, if the rainy season is a good annual rainfall, the agent-based model will randomly select: 
- numberOfHighRateGoodRainfallLevel land plots for which, according to their land type, the 
quantity of each natural resource (fertility, fodder, NTFP) will be recovered with a high rate of 
100% of their initial value; 
- numberOfMediumRateGoodRainfallLevel land plots for which, according to their land type, 
the quantity of each natural resource will be recovered with a medium rate of 50% of their 
initial value; 
- numberOfLowRateGoodRainfallLevel land plots for which, according to their land type, the 
quantity of each natural resource will be recovered with a low rate of 25% of their initial value; 
- numberOfZeroRateGoodRainfallLevel land plots for which the quantity of each natural 
resource will not be recovered.  
 
Table 6: Attributes for the number of land plots served by each level of rainfall according to the quality of the annual 
rainfall 
 Number of land 
plots with a high 
rate of 
replenishment 
Number of land plots 
with a medium rate 
of replenishment 
Number of land 
plots with a low 
rate of 
replenishment 
Number of land 
plots with a zero 
rate of 
replenishment 
On a good 
annual 
rainfall  










































Each regulator agent manages a more or less wide territory, on which he distributes at each season 
resource access rights. During the step, each time a regulator give a resource access right to a user on 
a certain plot, for a certain surface (ha) and a certain duration, these surface is subtracted from the 
value of the attribute “available Hectares” of the concerned land plot and the concerned land regulator 
23 
 
for all the duration of the resource access right. For example, if a user receives from the state agent a 
right to use on 10 hectares for 8 seasons at a spatial scale of 50 hectares for the land plot area, the 
attribute “availableHaState” takes the value 50-10 = 40 hectares for the next 8 step. At the end of the 
8th step, the 10 hectares are re-injected on the value of the attribute availableHaState of the land plot, 
and therefore made available again for the users for future requests.  
Note here that this dynamic does not apply to user-regulator agents because they necessarily 
distribute a seasonal resource access rights which lasts only one step. They indeed decide at each 
beginning of step if they are going to exploit by themselves their land plot(s), or if they will partially or 
entirely make these surfaces available to the other user requests. The surfaces exploit through free 
lend or rent by other users are therefore re-injected to the user-regulators land capital at each end of 
step.  
During the simulation, according to the sources of land regulation the modeler decides or not to 
introduce, the mobilization of these sources of regulation by the users will potentially evolve, and this 
will impact the evolution of the number of available hectares of each land regulation sources on the 
land plots. This dynamic represents in the agent-based model the overlap of land regulation sources. 
It develops the fact that several users can ask for an access right to the same space and for the same 
resource, according to the source of regulation they choose to mobilize. We will potentially find in the 
agent-based model four user agents trying to exploit the resources of the same surface on the same 
land plot, given for one by a land chief agent, for another by a local community agent, for a third by a 
user-regulator and for the last one by the state agent.  
The agent-based model voluntary does not go beyond this problematic statement. It does not choose 
if and if so which land regulation source is more important (i.e. which user get to exploit the resources 
in the end), it is only highlight the overlap, and let the model randomly decides itself.  
3. : INITIALISATION OF THE ABM SIMULATIONS 
i. Calibration of the simulation 
The environment of the agent-based model is composed of 900 land plots. This proportion is fixed (1) 
in order to authorize the representation of different general spatial scales (according to the value of 
the land plot area) and (2) in order to control the number of land plot of each land type created, 
through the class model attributes: numberOfLowLandSoil, numberOfDegradedSoil and 
numberOfSandySoil. For my set of simulation, the proportion of each land type is equal (300 of each). 
The lowlands (blue), the intermediary sandy areas (cream) and the degraded lands (pink) are randomly 
distributed within the environment (see Figure 9), in order to highlight the variability of this Sahelian 
environment.  
Each land plot contains a set of attributes on natural resources: fertility, fodder, and non-timber forest 
products (NTFP).  The initial quantity of each resource is equal to 5 units per hectare if the land plot is 
a lowland soil, 2 units per hectare if it is a sandy soil and 1 unit per hectare if it is a degraded soil. The 




Figure 9: Environment of the agent-based model 
In this regard, three choices of initialization exist in the agent-based model, linked to the three possible 
values of land plot area (see Table 7). If the modeler chooses the INIT A, all the land plot of the 
environment will have their attribute landPlotArea equal to 1, if he chooses INIT B equal to 50 and if 
he chooses INIT C equal to 1000. It is not possible during the same simulation to have at the same time 
a land plot area equal to 1 and another equal to 1000. The idea is that the general landscape represents 
different  
Table 7: three choices of initialization for three space scale representations 
Initialization Land plot Area Total Area of the environment Nature of the 
landscape 
INIT A 1 hectare 900 ha / 9 km2 a village territory 
INIT B 50 hectares 45 000 ha / 450 km2 a set of local 
communities 
INIT C 1000 hectares 900 000 ha / 9000 km2 a region 
Consequently to these three possible choices of Initialization, the number of social and passive entities 
will also vary (see Table 8). 














Number of User agent 
INIT A 1 ha 1 1 5 200 
(family level) 
INIT B  50 ha 1 5 20 1000 
(village level) 
INIT C   1000 ha 1 20 56 1000 
(group of villages level) 
 
For the particular case of user agents, the equivalence between the space scales is linked to the fact 
that a user agent does not represent the same social entity at the three scales. The coherence is 
founded through the combination of the number of user agent created and the value of their attributes 




Figure 10: equivalence of user agent number and attributes according to the choice of space scale 
For the INIT A, user agents represent rural families, evolving on the general landscape of a village 
territory. Every user agent represents a more or less important family: the size of the family known 
with the attribute “collective members” is randomly initially defined by the agent-based model 
between a minFamilyMember and a maxFamilyMember attributes, varying from ten to twenty from 
one user agent to another. This defines consequently the food self-sufficiency threshold to reach for 
each family. Each user agent has also an attribute “capital”, which symbolizes the gathering of the 
physical capital, the human capital and the financial capital. The initial value of this capital is randomly 
defined according to the size of the family: for one user agent, each member of the family has an 
individual capital value chosen randomly among the values: # (1 5 10 20 50 100 500), and the final 
initial capital of the user agent is the sum of this various individual capital. The idea is to represent the 
diversity of production means that different Sahelian rural families can possess.  
For the INIT B, user agents represent this time villages (as grouping of several families) evolving on a 
global landscape equivalent to a set of local communities. For the INIT C, user agents represent groups 
of several villages, evolving on a global landscape similar to a region. The equivalences in terms of 
number of user agents created (and of the collective members of each user agent) have been 
estimated regarding the change of land plot area from one initialization to another. The initialization 
of the attribute capital for the init B and C follows the same principle as for the init A.  
The perception of land tenure security is specific to each user agent, and defined in the agent-based 
model through the values of the attributes “perceptionOfAccessRightDuration” and 
“perceptionOfResourceRegulation”. The “perception of access right duration” is varying from 2 up to 
10, the value is randomly initially fixed. As a reminder, for any right to invest in the use, if the duration 
of the access right delivered by the regulator goes below this perception of access right duration, the 
user will consider the act of investment too risky, and will opt for extensive activities. 
The “perception of resources and their regulation(s)” is varying from 1 up to 30 for the INIT A, and from 
1 up to 15 for the INIT B and C, and the value is also randomly initially fixed. This reflects the idea that 
the level of information that land actors possess about land regulations strongly vary from one user to 
another, some of them have a perception that only extend on their village, or their land territory 
26 
 
whereas others will know what is happening in the all country (i.e. the total environment of the agent-
based model) (see Figure 11). As a reminder, user agents mobilize this attribute when they look for 
available land plots which possess the resources they need, it defines the extent of the land plots they 
consider. The same attribute is used when user agents look for water sources and send water requests 
to the water regulators of the water sources they found.  
 
Figure 11: Illustration of the diversity of the levels of perception, reflecting the level of information of the agent user. 
Level of perception of the lower left user: 2; level of perception of the upper right user: 10. The environment represents 
the different land territories of the land chief agents 
At last, according to the amount of capital they possess, the characteristics of their land access rights, 
the fact that they can access water or not, user agents can have up to 6 possible choices of rural 


















Intensive farming 50 500 500  10 5 
Extensive farming 2 20  2  
Intensive 
breeding 
120 1000 1000   10  
Extensive 
breeding 
6 60 60  2  
Intensive NTFP 
harvesting 
20 250 250 10 5 
Extensive NTFP 
harvesting 
1 10  2  
 
The environment of the model is divided for each type of regulator agent (Land Chief, Local Community 
and State) in more or less territories according to the type of agent and the choice of Initialization (see 
Figure 12). For land chief agents, it represents their respective land territories, and for local community 
agents the decentralized territories they are mandated to manage. For the state agent (only one agent 
of this type created no matter the choice of Initialization), he always manages the whole territory 
(known as the state domain).  
According to the choice of initialization made, the number of each type of water source (and the 
number of water regulator agents in consequence), as well as the quantity of water they contain will 
also not be the same: 
Initializ
ation 
Number of ponds Number of 
wells  
Number of drillings 
 
Good rainfall  Medium rainfall Bad 
rainfall 
INIT A 6 3 2 8 1 
Water initial quantity : 100 units Water initial 
quantity : 200 
units 
Water initial quantity : 
50 000 units 
INIT B 30 15 10 100 30 
Water initial quantity : 1000 units Water initial 
quantity : 10 
000 units 
Water initial quantity : 
50 000 units 





Water initial quantity : 
200 000 units 
 
These water sources are initially (for the well and the drillings) of at each beginning of rainy season 





LAND REGULATION SOURCE : LAND CHIEF 
INIT A : 5 land chief 
agents and their 
territories 
INIT B : 20 land chief 
agents and their 
territories 
INIT C : 56 land chief 




LAND REGULATION SOURCE : LOCAL COMMUNITY 
INIT A : 1 local 
community agent and 
his territory 
INIT B : 5 local 
community agent and 
their territories 
INIT C : 20 local 
community agent and 
their territories 
   




Figure 13: random initial distribution of the water sources passive entities within the environment (INIT B) 
Land regulator agents (see Table 10), water regulator agents (see Table 11) and user-regulators ((see 
Table 12) allocate at each growing season access rights on their territory, water source or land plot(s). 
The different components of an access right are fixed according to the choice of logic of action. 
Table 10: calibration of the different parameters composing a resource access right according to the logic of action of the 
land regulator agent 
Detail of a resource 
access right:  
#social #economic #enviroConserv #enviroResto 
A nature of 
resource access 
right 
Randomly chooses between #rightToUse and #rightToInvestInTheUse  
 
A surface, in 
hectares, localized 




size) / (number of 
users requests) 
Follows the 
users wishes in 
their requests 
EnviroOptimalSi
ze = (Number of 
land plots with 
low fertility) / 
(Number of user 
of the regulator 
community) 
EnviroOptimalSize 
= (Number of land 
plots with high 
fertility) / (Number 
of user of the 
regulator 
community) 
A period Randomly chooses between: #drySeason, #rainySeason and #annual 
A duration Randomly selects between #( 1 1 1 1 2 
2 2 2 6 6 10 20 30 100) 
Randomly selects between #( 1 1 1 1 2 
2 2 2 6 6) 
A access price  rentingPriceComm






#( 5 10 20 
50 100) 
rentingPriceCommunity = Randomly 
selects between: 




Table 11: calibration of the different parameters composing a water access right according to the logic of action of the 
water regulator agent 
Detail of a resource 
access right:  
#social #economic #enviro 
Quantity of water (water source total 
quantity of water) / 
(number of users 
requests) 
Authorize the quantity 
users request while 
the water source 
quantity >0 
Authorize the quantity 
the users request 
while the water source 
quantity is higher than 
one third of the initial 
water source quantity 
(in relation with the 
water source nature) 
Water Price waterPrice = 0 waterPrice = 
Randomly selects 
between: #( 0.05 0.1 
0.5 1) 
waterPrice = Randomly 
selects between: #( 0 
0.05 0.1) 
Access Duration waterRightDuration = 1 ( only seasonal water access rights) 
 
Table 12: calibration of the different parameters composing a resource access right according to the logic of action of the 
user-regulator agent 
Detail of a resource 
access right:  




A nature of 
resource access 
right 
Randomly chooses between #rightToUse and #rightToInvestInTheUse  
 
A surface, in 
hectares, localized 
on one or several 
land plot(s) 
Adjusts  the users wishes in their requests to the number of hectares available 
(if the number of hectares requested by a user is lower than the total hectares 
available, the user-regulator will follow the user wishes, if not, he will give him the 
maximum of hectares still available) 
A period Give the one of the user-regulator access right 
A duration RentingDuration = 1 ( only seasonal land access rights) 
A access price  socialRentingPrice 
= 0 
The renting price is equal to 
the price/ha of the initial 
land right (that the user-
regulator first received) + 
(price/ha interestRate). 
 
interestRate = Randomly 
select between: #( 0 5 10 20 
50) 
The renting price is 
equal to the price/ha of 
the initial land right 
(that the user-regulator 
first received) 
 
At the beginning of each rainy season, the agent-based model randomly chooses the quality of the 
rainfall. According to this quality, the number of land plots for which the natural resource are totally 
(highRate attribute) or partially (mediumRate: 50%, lowRate: 25%, or zeroRate: 0% of replenishment) 





Table 13: calibration of the rainfall dynamic according to its annual quality 
Number of land plots 
associated to each level rate 















For a good annual rainfall  
(one in six chance) 
300 275 275 50 
For a medium annual rainfall  
(one in three chance) 
75 350 300 175 
For a bad annual rainfall (one 
in two chance) 
0 150 450 300 
 
 
Figure 14: illustration of the rainfall dynamic high spatial variability on a good annual rainfall 
ii. Synopsis of the simulation 
At the initialization (no matter the choice of INIT), all the environment of the model is divided in land 
territories managed by default by different land chiefs (representing the historical context, the weight 
of tradition). User agents are created and randomly localized in this environment (and thus attached 
to a specific land territory and a local community). Water regulators and their water sources are also 
created and randomly localized in the environment.  
Each land chief agent chooses a certain logic of action, and allocates consequently resource access 
rights to the users of his land territory. This will constitute their initial “land capital”. The other 
regulator agents (local communities and state) are also created, and linked to a set of land plots (or to 
the all environment for the state agent), but they are not active for now as land regulators, they do 
not exist in the user agents perception.  
During the simulation, it is possible for the modeler to introduce up to all the land regulation sources, 
and by doing so activate the State, and/or the local community and/or the user-regulator agents as 
land regulators. To do so, as explained above, the modeler can modify the value of one or several of 
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the attributes: “Land Chief update”, “Local Community update”, “State update” or “Other User 
update” of the land plots, according to the source of regulation considered for the scenario. These 
“update” attributes are by default equal to zero, and it is by modifying the value of these attributes 
that the modeler can introduce new sources of land regulation in the simulation. It will potentially 
change de nature of the prevalent source of land regulation on the concerned land plot, and its 
mobilization by the user agents in consequence.  
The time step in the agent-based model is the growing season. A simulation consists of a succession of 
rainy and dry seasons (one year corresponds thus to two steps) which lasts the number of years 
considered necessary for the simulated scenario. Both steps (rainy and dry season) take place globally 
similarly (see Figure 15 and 16). The main difference is that in the beginning of the rainy season, we 
observe, linked to the rainfall, the reconstitution of natural resources and the formation of ponds 
whereas at the beginning of dry season, there is no natural resources reconstitution and the ponds 
disappear.  
Besides these ecological dynamics, users begin both steps by asking for water access rights to the water 
regulators of the various water sources. According to the positive of negative response of the water 
regulators, users make a first choice of activity. Another specificity of the dry season is that a user with 
no water access will not be able to realize rural activities at all (any activity necessarily requires water 
in this period of the year). These choices of activities can lead to a need of natural resources that users 
ask to the various land regulators. According to what they finally obtained by the land regulators who 
follow their own logics of action, users will maintain or modify their initial choice of activity, and 
eventually exploit and consume the various resources of the environment, in order to produce and 
improve their capital.   
 




Figure 16: sequence diagram of the dry season step 
iii. Indicators 
 
On this basis, according to the choices of scenario implemented, simulations are conducted, with each 
agent representing one of the various types of actor, developing his logic of action according to his 
perception and drawing from several overlapping land and natural resource regulation sources at the 
same time.  
The effects resulting from the simulation of land policy options are subsequently deducted from the 
agents’ behaviors (during and at the end of the successive simulations) rather than predetermined by 
a causal chain of effects. These effects are thus the result of the pooling of actors' various logics of 
action, which are motivated by their various representations. During and at the end of the simulation, 
several indicators can allow the operator to explore different aspects of change between the initial 
situation and the final situation, at the general level of the agent-based model (see Table 14) and at a 




Table 14: choice of indicators to follow at the general level of the agent-based model 







(see Figure 17) 
badRainfallLevel Record the number of bad annual rainfall during the simulation ( i.e. step after 
step) 
mediumRainfallLevel Record the number of medium annual rainfall during the simulation 
goodRainfallLevel Record the number of good annual rainfall during the simulation 
landPlotFertility Follow the evolution of the general quantity of fertility within all the environment 
during the simulation 
landPlotFodder Follow the evolution of the general quantity of fodder within the all environment 
during the simulation 
landPlotNTFP Follow the evolution of the general quantity of NTFP within the all environment 
during the simulation 
drillingWaterQuantity Follow the evolution of the general quantity of water of all the drillings during 
the simulation 
wellWaterQuantity Follow the evolution of the general quantity of water of all the wells all the 









(see Figure 21 and 22) 
landChiefLevel Record the number of activities realized by user agents through resource access 
rights delivered by land chief agents  
landPlotlandChiefAvailableHa Follow the evolution of the general number of available hectares to allocate for 
the land chief agents  
landPlotlandChiefRegulation Follow the evolution of the general number of land plots with users exploiting on 
it under land chief regulations  
localCommunityLevel Record the number of activities realized by user agents through resource access 
rights delivered by local communities agents 
landPlotlocalCommunityAvailableHa Follow the evolution of the general number of available hectares to allocate for 
the local community agents 
landPlotlocalCommunityRegulation Follow the evolution of the general number of land plots with users exploiting on 
it under local community regulations 
stateLevel Record the number of activities realized by user agents through resource access 
rights delivered by the state agent 
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landPlotStateAvailableHa Follow the evolution of the general number of available hectares to allocate for 
the state agent 
landPlotStateRegulation Follow the evolution of the general number of land plots with users exploiting on 
it under state regulations 
otherUserLevel Record the number of activities realized by user agents through resource access 
rights delivered by user-regulator agents 
landPlotOtherUserRegulation Follow the evolution of the general number of land plots with users exploiting on 
it under user-regulator regulations 
numberOfInterUserAccessRightDelivered Record the number of resource access rights delivered by user-regulator agents 
during the simulation 
noneRegulationLevel Record the number of land plots with no land regulation source management 
during the simulation (No land regulator is allocating any access right on these 
land plots) 
oneRegulationLevel Record the number of land plots with one land regulation source management 
during the simulation (One nature of land regulator is allocating access rights on 
these land plots) 
twoRegulationLevel Record the number of land plots with two overlapping land regulation sources 
management during the simulation (Two natures of land regulator are allocating 
access rights at the same time on these land plots) 
threeRegulationLevel Record the number of land plots with three overlapping land regulation sources 
management during the simulation (Three natures land regulator are allocating 





User access rights and 
activities dynamics   
 
(see Figure 20) 
userCapital Follow the evolution of the general capital of all user agents during the 
simulation 
extensiveBreedingLevel   Record the number of users realizing extensive breeding during the simulation 
intensiveBreedingLevel Record the number of users realizing intensive breeding during the simulation 
extensiveFarmingLevel Record the number of users realizing extensive farming during the simulation 
intensiveFarmingLevel Record the number of users realizing intensive farming during the simulation 
extensiveNTFPHarvestingLevel Record the number of users realizing extensive NTFP Harvesting during the 
simulation 




numberOfLandPlotUsers Record the number of land plots with user agents possessing access rights on it 
during the simulation 
numberOfUsersWithActivities Record the number of users who realize activities during the simulation 




Record the number of users with resource access rights requests during the 
simulation 
numberOfUsersWithWaterAccessRights Record the number of users with water access rights in their portfolio during the 
simulation 




Attributes for the calculation of the probe are associated to spatial entities 
Attributes for the calculation of the probe are associated to social entities 
Attributes for the calculation of the probe are associated to passive entities 
The calculation of the probe is associated to attributes at the agent-based 
Cormas model level  
 
 
Table 15: choice of indicators to follow at the entities local level of the agent-based model 
Thematic of the 
probes 






collectiveMembers Inform the modeler of the number of members of each user agent (family, village or 
group of villages) 
foodSelfSufficiencyThreshold Inform the modeler of the food self-sufficiency threshold of each user agent 
according to the number of its collective  
logicUserRegulator Inform the modeler of the logic of action follow by each potential user-regulator 
numberOfAccessRights Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right each user agent 
possesses during the simulation (i.e. step after step) 
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numberOfAccessRightRequests Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right each user agent requests 
during the simulation 
numberOfAccessRightAvailableToShare Inform the modeler of the number of access right to his land plot each user agent 
makes available to other user agents during the simulation 
numberofOtherUserAccessRightDelivered Inform the modeler of the number of access right to his land plot each user agent 
delivers to other user agents during the simulation 
numberofOtherUserRequests Inform the modeler of the number of access right requests each user-regulator 
agent receives from other user agents during the simulation 
numberOfWaterAccessRights Inform the modeler of the number of water access right each user agent possesses 
during the simulation  
numberOfWaterAccessRequests Inform the modeler of the number of water access right each user agent requests 
during the simulation 
LandChief agent Logic (see Figure 18) Inform the modeler of the logic of action follow by each land chief agent  
numberOfUsersDeliveredLandChief Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right each land chief agent 
delivers to user agents during the simulation 
numberOfUsersRequestsLandChief Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right requests each land chief 
agent receives from user agents during the simulation 
LocalCommunity 
agent 
Logic (see Figure 18) Inform the modeler of the logic of action follow by each local community agent 
numberOfUsersDeliveredLocalCommunity Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right each local community 
agent delivers to user agents during the simulation 
numberOfUsersRequestsLocalCommunity Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right requests each local 
community agent receives from user agents during the simulation 
State agent Logic (see Figure 18) Inform the modeler of the logic of action follow by the state agent 
numberOfUsersDeliveredState Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right the state agent delivers 
to user agents during the simulation 
numberOfUsersRequestsState Inform the modeler of the number of resource access right requests the state agent 
receives from user agents during the simulation 
Water regulator 
agent 
Logic (see Figure 19) Inform the modeler of the logic of action follow by each water regulator agent 
numberOfWaterAccessDelivered Inform the modeler of the number of water access right each water regulator agent 
delivers to user agents during the simulation 
numberOfWaterAccessRequests Inform the modeler of the number of water access right requests each water 
regulator agent receives from user agents during the simulation 
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Landplot  activitiesOnTheLandPlot Inform the modeler of the number of ongoing activities on each land plot during the 
simulation 
usersOfTheLandPlot Inform the modeler of the number of user agents with ongoing resource access right 
on each land plot during the simulation 
Fertility  Inform the modeler of the evolution of fertility quantity on each land plot during the 
simulation 
Fodder Inform the modeler of the evolution of fodder quantity on each land plot during the 
simulation 
NTFP Inform the modeler of the evolution of NTFP on each land plot during the simulation 




Soil fertility state Fodder state NTFP state 
   




Figure 18: illustration of land regulators diversity of logics of action for one simulation 
LAND CHIEFS LOCAL COMMUNITIES STATE USER-REGULATORS 
    
 
 


























EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE HECTARES 
LAND CHIEFS LOCAL COMMUNITIES STATE 
STEP 1 
   
STEP 6 
   
STEP 25 
   
Figure 21 : land dynamics and evolution of the number of hectares available for each type of land regulator agent once 





DYNAMIC OF OVERLAPPING OF LAND REGULATION SOURCES  













4. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
 
Verification of a model means “getting the model right” (Parker et al. 2003). Model validation is 
“getting the right model” (Parker et al. 2003), meaning that the correct abstract model was chosen and 
accurately represents real-world trends and patterns. Verification and validation of ABMs have been 
the focus of much attention (Robinson et al. 2007, Filatova et al. 2013).  
 
The agent-based model was verified using complementary verification procedures: a code review by 
another agent-based modeler and a set of stress tests to monitor the behavior of the model in extreme 
situations. We also implemented unit tests for each sub-model that run parts of the model in a 
controlled way and then ran the model with very few agents in order to examine the results closely 
(e.g. according to the life history of each specific agent). The parametrization of the agent-based model 
as it stands is based on an indirect proportional calibration (abstract units, real ratios). We used our 
empirical data to run large numbers of calibrations with various model parameters and we compared 
our model outputs with empirical data. We finally chose the combination of model parameters which 
replicated the empirical data best (Schwarz and Ernst 2009) and sufficiently well reproduced patterns 
actually observed in in the field (Grimm 2006, 2010). 
There are a number of ABM validation approaches (Bousquet et al. 2003, Castella et al. 2005, Janssen 
and Ostrom 2006, Grimm 2006, 2010, Schwarz and Ernst 2009). Our validation aimed to ensure that 
the fundamental structural and behavioral components in the agent-based model captured the main 
aspects of the actual stakeholder-oriented pluralism of land regulation. We thus ran a set of 
consistency checks to validate the default situation we sought to represent. The agent-based model 
involves a lot of parameters, with a large proportion of randomization in the initial choices of value 
(but the different potential values are all known). The default situation we seek to represent is a 
pluralistic Sahelian land regulation pattern, so the part of plurality and uncertainty (illustrate by the 
use of randomization) is essential.   The consistency  tests consisted on initially set parameters which 
were normally randomly chosen  
As a reminder, this default situation represents a pluralist Sahelian environment composed of different 
natural environments (i.e. land types) linked to a high variability and uncertainty regarding natural 
resources evolution and availability (through random annual rainfall). This environment is divided in 
land territories managed by different water and land chief regulator agents according to their own 
logic of action (prioritizing economic, social or environmental objectives). User agents have specific 
and diversified perception of land tenure security, composed by a diversified level of information on 
the resources surrounding them and on the source(s) of regulation managing it (through their specific 
value of their attribute “perception of resource regulation”) and by a diversified level of investment 
security (through their specific value of their attribute “perception of access right duration”).  
We realized most of the tests at the space scale of the choice of INIT B (a land plot area is equal to 50 
hectares), where user agents represent villages (as grouping of several families) evolving on a space 
equivalent to a set of local communities. I chose to work on this space scale (1) because it is the first 
one on which I developed the conceptual agent-based model, it is therefore the more accomplished 
one, and (2) because this scale propose an intermediary analysis window of the pluralism of land 
regulation, between a more local one (at the scale of few villages) and a more general one (at the scale 
of a large region).  
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Simulations for the tests are based on a 10 years temporality, equivalent to 20 steps (one step = one 
dry/rainy cultural season) for each simulation. Each consistency test simulation has been repeated 20 
times. Each graphic of the results chooses the evolution of the different observed indicators for each 
repetition.  
(0) Scenario by default : simulation of a traditional pluralism of land regulation (left column of 
the attached figures 3 to 6) 
This reference simulation is a twenty repetition of the default pluralist land regulation situation, where 
land access are delivered by land chief agents (without any introduction in the simulation of another 
source of land regulation) according to a plurality of logics of action. The characteristics of the water 
and resource access rights delivered (nature, price, duration, periodicity, quantity of water of hectares 
delivered etc.) depend on the regulator logic. The rainfall and natural resource dynamics are subject 
to the uncertainty and variability of a Sahelian environmental context. The observed results show that 
on average between half and two third of the user agents have ongoing resource access rights over 
time (3.1 to 6.1) and that these resource access rights concern between one and two third of the land 
plots (3.2 to 6.2). According to the quality of annual rainfall, and to the alternation of rainy and dry 
seasons the number of user agents benefiting from water access rights strongly varies2 (3.3 to 6.3). 
The number of user agents realizing rural activities over time also strongly varies according to the 
alternation of rainy and dry season, because in the dry seasons activities depends on water access (no 
water access rights, no possibility of realizing an activity for the user agents) (3.4 to 6.4). This pluralist 
traditional land regulation management leads to an overall good environmental state of water (3.5 to 
6.5) and natural resources (3.6 to 6.6), which tend to stand or increase over time. All in all, the 
randomization of regulators’ logics of action choices and of rainfall dynamic seems to have a significant 
impact on several indicators, according to the disparity of probe evolutions within the repetitions. 
(1) Scenario of the consistency Test One: only good annual rainfall (see attached figure 1) 
For this first consistency test, we only changed the rainfall dynamic parametrized by default with the 
respective probabilities of occurrence: good rainfall (1/6), medium rainfall (1/3), bad rainfall (1/2) to 
only good rainfall at each step of rainy season (one in two step). The idea was to test if the removal of 
Sahelian high uncertainty and variability regarding rainfall and natural resource replenishment has a 
significant impact on the evolution of natural resources.  If we compare the results of this consistency 
test to the ones of the default situation, the observed indicators confirm indeed that with only good 
annual rainfall, water and natural resources are consequently more abundant.  
(2) Scenario of the consistency Test Two: only seasonal resource access rights distributed by 
land regulators (see attached figure 2) 
Land regulators have by default the possibility to decide, according to their logic of action, of the 
duration of each resource access right they distribute to the users (from seasonal access rights to 
access rights available for several years). For this consistency test, we set this duration to only seasonal 
resource access rights (available only for the season or the step). This second consistency test has been 
developed to test the meaning of different indicators, and to insist on the fact that a single indicator 
often shows only part of the information and it remains an interesting exercise to cross this first 
information with other indicator evolutions, to have a better understanding of what is happening 
overall in the simulation. Here, if we compare the results of the consistency test with the ones of the 
default situation, some of the observed results pointed out that users have no access rights in their 
                                                          
2 The strong variation rainy/dry season is illustrated by the saw-tooth reading of the probes 
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portfolio neither have a use of a land plot anymore (2.1 and 2.2). But if we look another indicator 
showing the proportion of users that realize rural activities (for which they need to have resource 
access rights) at each step, this indicator evolves during the simulation, illustrating the weaker but 
existing seasonal resource access right interactions (2.3). Interactions between users and regulators 
on one hand, and between users and the land plots on the other hand are not visible in time because 
they last only for one season and are happening quietly within the step, but this consistency test shows 
that they exist anyway.  
(3) Consistency tests on fixation of water and land regulator logic of action 
The following four consistency tests have been developed in order to test the effect of the plurality of 
land and water regulators logics of action. In the default situation, regulator agents have indeed 
initially a random choice between four logics of action to allocate land and water access rights: 
economic, social, environmental pro conservation and environmental pro restoration. For each of the 
four consistency tests, this choice of logic of action has been fixed, and for some test linked to other 
“extreme” situations (i.e. modifications of other parameters). The same set of indicators is observed 
for each of these four consistency tests of regulators logics of action.  
(4) Scenario of the consistency Test Three: only social priority logics of action for water and land 
regulators (see attached figure 3) 
For this consistency test, we fixed all the water and land regulators with logics of action prioritizing 
social objectives. It means that water and land access are free in term of cost, and that regulators care 
to give equal resource and water access rights to each of the requesting users. If we compare the 
results of the consistency test with the ones of the default situation, results show that consequently 
to this “free fare access”, almost every user agent has a water and a land access right (3.1), and the 
hole environment is open to users (i.e. almost each land plot has at least one user with a resource 
access right allowing him to farm it) (3.2). But because regulator agents do not monitor the 
environmental state of water sources and natural resources before allowing access to it, these 
resources are totally consumed at each rainy season (3.5 and 3.6), meaning that there is not more 
water or natural resource available at each dry season for the users to realize their rural activities at 
this period (3.3 and 3.4). 
(5) Scenario of the consistency Test Four: only environmental conservation priority logics of 
action for water and land regulators on an environment only composed of fertile lowlands 
(see attached figure 4) 
For this consistency test, we fixed all the water and land regulators with logics of action prioritizing 
conservation environmental objectives. It means that all regulators will estimate the natural state of 
their resource (water, fodder, fertility, NTFP) before allowing access on the land plot or the water 
source, and above a certain threshold they will close this access in order to optimize the environmental 
durability of the resource. We also fixed the environment which by default is composed of 1/3 of fertile 
lowlands, 1/3 of intermediary sandy soils and 1/3 of degraded soils, to only fertile lowland land plots. 
This extreme situation has been developed in order to test the reactivity of enviro-conservationist 
regulators when all the natural resources are in great environmental state (and are therefore qualify 
to be protected from use by the regulators, to optimize their conservation). If we compare the results 
of the consistency test with the ones of the default situation, results show that from the beginning of 
the simulation, the threshold of natural resources is exceeded for land regulators, and they directly 
close the access to their land plots in order to create protected natural reserves. Therefore, even if 
some of the users still succeeding in obtaining water access rights (4.3), no users have resource access 
46 
 
rights (4.1), no one realize any rural activities (4.4) and none of the land plots are under user farming 
(4.2). Water and natural resources are consequently abundant (4.5 and 4.6). 
(6) Scenario of the consistency Test Five: only environmental restoration priority logics of action 
for water and land regulators on an environment only composed of degraded soils (see 
attached figure 5) 
For this consistency test, we fixed all the water and land regulators with logics of action prioritizing 
restoration environmental objectives. It means that all regulators will estimate the natural state of 
their resource (water, fodder, fertility, NTFP) before allowing access on the land plot or the water 
source, and under a certain threshold they will close this access in order to allowing the replenishment 
of the different resources. We also fixed the environment which by default is composed of 1/3 of fertile 
lowlands, 1/3 of intermediary sandy soils and 1/3 of degraded soils, to only degraded soil land plots. 
This extreme situation has been developed in order to test the reactivity of environmental regulators 
with restoration logics when all the natural resources are in poor environmental state (and are 
therefore qualify to be protected from use by the regulators, to optimize their replenishment). If we 
compare the results of the consistency test with the ones of the default situation, results show that 
the number of user agents with resource access rights on their portfolio (5.1), and the number of land 
plots for which user agents possess ongoing access rights (5.2) depend more of the rainfall dynamic 
and the succession of dry and rainy seasons. The same number of users realizes activities over time 
(5.4), but on a lower number of land plots. The environmental water regulation is more severe than 
the land one, and at best only one third of the user agents receive water access rights at the end of 
the simulation (5.3). At last, the environment being only composed of degraded soils, the 
environmental state of fodder resources is lower than for the default situation (5.6) even if an 
environmental regulation is established.  
(3.1) Scenario of the consistency Test Six: only economic priority logics of action for water and 
land regulators, with only high water and land access prices (see attached figure 6) 
For this consistency test, we fixed all the water and land regulators with logics of action prioritizing 
economic objectives. Water and land access prices are fixed to their higher unit values and all 
regulators choose to give resource and water access rights in priority to the requesting users with the 
higher capital. Results show that as same as for the consistency test with the regulators’ logics of action 
fixed on social priority objectives, the non-consideration of the environmental state of natural 
resources before allowing access to it leads to a situation where almost every user agents have ongoing 
resource access rights (6.1) on the totally of the environment (6.2) (all the land plots have user agents 
with ongoing access rights to it). But contrary to the social priority objectives, user agents have to pay 
this time in order to access to the right to (invest in the) use of a land plot, and few of them are able 
to afford this land price (the same reasoning is applying to water access rights). This leads to a situation 
were less than half of the users realize activities during the raining season (6.4) (against the totally of 
the users for the social priority consistency test, and the three-quarters for the default situation).  
(7) General review of the consistency tests 
The pluralist default situation seems to create a form of balance between human and environmental 
interactions (social actions vs environmental sustainability). The balance is troubled each time we 
reduce the plurality and the random aspect of the significant parameters of the agent-based model.  
Based on this pluralist default situation, a lot of simulation scenarios are possible according to the 
question or the areas each potential user of the agent-based model wants to explore. 
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5. EXPLORATION OF NEW LAND REGULATION SOURCE(S) SIMULATION SCENARIOS  
 
As explained before, land use policies have accentuated over time this already existing complexity. 
Indeed, rather than abandoning their practices, local populations have added the land tenure policies 
set up successively to their pre-existing sources of regulation. The aim of the developed scenarios of 
simulation was to explore these additions of new land regulations to the complexity existing by default, 
with regards to the ways users seems to perceive these changes, and take them (or not) into account 
in their logics of mobilization of a pluralism of land regulations.  
As a reminder, a user at least partially base his perception of land tenure security on the ways other 
users already exploiting the spaces that interest him have obtained their own land access rights.  The 
recognition by the other users, because this recognition assures him a non-contesting of his resource 
access right(s). This prevalence of a land regulation source is therefore defined as the source of 
regulation which is the most mobilized by the users of the area already exploiting the concerned 
natural resource. Changes in users’practices of mobilization of land regulations will therefore pass 
through changes in their perceptions of land tenure security linked to these prevalences of land 
regulation sources.  
Besides, changes in land regulation can be introduced through a diversity of intensities (as the 
proportion of users mobilizing this new land regulation source on a same area) and configurations (as 
the spatial distribution of the users mobilizing the new land regulation source). This leads to a diversity 
of landscape composition evolutions at a general scale, according to the introduced changes. For 
example, a new development project can bring changes in land regulation on one or several contigous 
areas (the project works with all the users of a village, of a local community, of a hydro-agricultural 
area…). A new land use policy will however concern all the users of the country, oftenly on a volontary 
basis (users have to launch the process of converting and formalizing their land rights).  
According to the intensity and the configuration of the introduced change, its nature, the pre-existing 
perceptions of land tenure security that users of the area(s) concerned by the land regulation change 
have or not, the expression of this stakeholder-oriented pluralism of regulation will vary. The scenarios 
of simulation particularly aim to explore the concept of perception thresholds, above which changes 
are observed in users’ practices of mobilisation of land regulation sources, but below which no matter 
the nature of the introduced change (for example, a new land use policy), it does not seem to be 
perceived, or in any case considered by Sahelian users. 
In order to do so, I chose to explore the diffusion of (a) new source(s) of land regulation, according to 
(1) the diversity of ways it can be introduced in the pluralist default situation of the agent-based model, 
(2) in relation with the diversity of users ‘perceptions, participating to the dissemination within the 
users’ practices of these new sources of regulation, above certain thresholds.  
These simulation scenarios can be explore in the agent-based model at the space scale of a village 
territory (INIT A), a set of local communities (INIT B) or a region (INIT C). I chose to realize the 
simulations at the scale of INIT B, to keep the idea of an intermediary analysis window of the pluralism 
of land regulation, between a more local one (at the scale of few villages) and a more general one (at 
the scale of a large region). 
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i. First set of simulation scenarios: to explore the dissemination of new land 
regulation source(s) according to its introduction pattern   
In addition to the initial/by default traditional land chief regulations, the agent-based model considers 
3 possible types of regulator agents linked to 3 sources/systems of regulation existing within the 
pluralism of land regulations for securing access to resources:  
- the local community agents, representing the decentralization policy (several new agents 
created), 
- the state agent, central as regionalized (a single new agent created), 
- the inter-users regulations (implemented directly by the user agents, no new agents created). 
For this set of simulation scenarios, I choose to work with the local community agents and the state 
agent, because they represent two different sources of external changes in the traditional by default 
land regulation. The state agent represent a single “top-down” regulator with its unique logic of action 
(which he randomly initially chooses) for allocating resource access rights on his land plots 
(representing the whole environment) while several local community agents are created, and each 
local community regulator agent initially choose its own logic of action to manage the resources of his 
decentralized territory (representing a portion of the whole environment).  
Perceptions of user agents are here plural and specific to each user agent, randomly chosen (between 
1 and 15) at the initialization of the model. The environment of the agent-based model is composed 
of 900 land plots, each land plot representing a 50 hectares area, for a total area of 45 000 hectares. A 
new land regulation source can appear in this environment through: 
-  a certain intensity: as the proportion of users mobilizing this new land regulation source on a 
same land plot. According to the nature of the new land regulation, the initial value of intensity 
on a land plot is introduced through the attributes: localCommunityUpdateValue and 
stateUpdateValue of each land plot; 
- a certain configuration: as the gathering of (1) the number of land plots concerned by this new 
land regulation source with (2) the distribution of these land plots (randomly spread within 
the whole environment, or contiguous on a certain area of the environment (for example: a 
village, a local community…). These variables are explored through the attributes: 
numberOfStateUpdate and numberOfLocalCommunityUpdate (for the number of land plots 
concerned by the new land regulation) and through the attribute choiceOfInitRegulation 
defining if the introduction pattern is contigous-localized or randomly spread within the 
environment of the agent-based model.  
We developed two series of simulation scenarios (see Table 16): one with a fixed intensity and a 
variable configuration, and one with a fixed configuration and a variable intensity. For each of these 
series, the new land regulation is introduced either by the State or by the local community agents. The 
idea behind this separate introduction is to test if the diffusion of a new land regulation is different 
depending on whether it is introduced through one central general regulator or through several 
decentralized local regulators.  
Simulations for the scenarios are also based on a 10 years temporality, equivalent to 20 steps (one 
step = one dry/rainy cultural season) for each simulation. Each scenario has been repeated 10 times. 
Each graphic of the attached figures A, B, C and C presenting the results chooses the average of the 
evolution of the different observed indicators for each repetition (i.e. one probe represent an average 
of 10 simulations). The calibration of the scenarios (the fact that we simulate during 20 steps, the value 
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interval, the fixed value to the number 20 etc.) results from an experimental stage of simulation 

















SYNOPSIS OF THE SCENARIO FIGURE 
DISTRIBUTION NUMBER OF 














Variable 1-100 Fixed, 20 1 A new land policy is conceived and implemented by the State. 
The new “fictive” users mobilizing the State for accessing land 
resources are disseminated within the whole country, and local 
initiatives of land interaction with the State emerge from an 
increasing number of local areas in the country, with a constant 




Fixed 20 Variable 1-
100 
2 A new land policy is conceived and implemented by the State. 
The new “fictive” users mobilizing the State for accessing land 
resources are disseminated within the whole country, on specific 
constant local areas. The intensity of “fictive” users mobilizing 
the State regulator on each of these constant local areas is 
increasing from one to one hundred users.  








Variable 1-100 Fixed, 20 3 A new land policy is conceived and implemented by the State. 
The new “fictive” users mobilizing the State for accessing land 
resources are neighbors who share a common contiguous spatial 
area of the environment. This contiguous spatial area constitutes 
an increasing portion of the whole environment. The intensity of 
“fictive” users mobilizing the State regulator on each land plot of 
the contiguous area is constant. 
FIGURE C 
left column 
Fixed 20 Variable 1-
100 
4 A new land policy is conceived and implemented by the State. 
The new “fictive” users mobilizing the State agent for accessing 
land resources are neighbors who share a common contiguous 
spatial area of the environment, of a constant size of 1000 
hectares. The intensity of “fictive” users mobilizing the State 
regulator on each of the land plots of this contiguous area is 





















Variable 1-100 Fixed, 20 5 A new land policy is conceived by the State but implemented by 
the local community regulators through a decentralization 
policy. The new “fictive” users mobilizing the local community 
regulators for accessing land resources are disseminated within 
the whole country, and initiatives of land interaction with the 
local communities emerge from an increasing number of local 
areas in the country, with a constant intensity of new “fictive” 




Fixed 20 Variable 1-
100 
6 A new land policy is conceived by the State but implemented by 
the local community regulators through a decentralization 
policy. The new “fictive” users mobilizing the local community 
regulators for accessing land resources are disseminated within 
the whole country, on specific constant local areas. The intensity 
of “fictive” users mobilizing the local community regulator of 
each of these constant local areas is increasing from one to one 











Variable 1-100 Fixed, 20 7 A new land policy is conceived by the State but implemented by 
the local community regulators through a decentralization 
policy. The new “fictive” users mobilizing the local community 
regulators for accessing land resources are neighbors who share 
a common contiguous spatial area of the environment. This 
contiguous spatial area constitutes an increasing portion of the 
whole environment. The intensity of “fictive” users mobilizing 
the local community regulator of each land plot of the 




Fixed 20 Variable 1-
100 
8 A new land policy is conceived by the State but implemented by 
the local community regulators through a decentralization 
policy. The new “fictive” users mobilizing the local community 
regulators for accessing land resources are neighbors who share 
a common contiguous spatial area of the environment, of a 
constant size of 1000 hectares. The intensity of “fictive” users 
mobilizing the local community regulator of each of the land 









Choice of indicators 
For this set of scenario simulations, we chose to explore the diffusion of a new land regulation source 
according to its introduction pattern through the evolution of users activities realized with resource 
access rights obtained by these different sources. 
We therefore followed the evolution of the indicators: 
- stateLevel: recording the number of activities realized by user agents over time through 
resource access rights delivered by the state agent; 
- localCommunityLevel: recording the number of activities realized by user agents over time 
through resource access rights delivered by local communities agents; 
- landChiefLevel: recording the number of activities realized by user agents through resource 
access rights delivered by land chief agents. 
Results analysis  
Results tend to show that no matter the characteristics of the new land regulation introduction 
pattern, a threshold, above which user agents mainly mobilize the new source for accessing 
resources (but under which this mobilization stays minimal), exists. As the panels 1 of the attached 
figures A to D show, the value of this threshold varies according to the new land regulation introduction 
pattern but stays concentrated around the value interval: [20-40], no matter the simulation fixed the 
intensity or the configuration of the new land regulation introduced. Each probe of the graphic shows 
the evolution of the number of users (on a total of 1000) mobilizing the State (left graphic) or the local 
Communities (right graphic) for the realization of their activities at each season over time. The strong 
variation rainy/dry season illustrated by the saw-tooth reading of the probes still represents the high 
variability of water and natural resource availability from one season to another, affecting the number 
of water and resource access rights delivered and so on the number of users able to realize an activity.  
Besides, for the same values of intensity and configuration of introduction pattern, the new land 
regulation source observes a more widespread diffusion when it is initially randomly spread within 
the entire environment than when it is introduced only on a contiguous localized area. Panels 1 of 
the Figures A and B show that between 800 and 1000 users mobilize the new land regulation source 
above the threshold of perception whereas it concerns only 350 to 600 users on the panels 1 of the 
Figures C and D. And these proportions are rapidly achieved when the introduction pattern is randomly 
spread whereas probes are slowly increasing to reach their final level when the introduction pattern is 
contiguously localized.   
This last statement is confirmed by the impact of the new land regulation source on the initial 
traditional land chief regulation. When the introduction of the new source is randomly spread, results 
show a threshold above which the land chief regulation nearly disappears while when this 
introduction is contiguously localized it has almost no impact on the mobilization of land chief 
regulation by the users. Indeed, above a threshold of 40-50 for the value of the variable parameter 
(intensity of number of land plots), panels 2 of the figures A and B show that the mobilization of the 
initial traditional land chief regulation sources is reduced to a minimum whereas such a threshold does 
not exist on the panels 2 of the Figures C and D where around 700 users still mainly mobilize the 
traditional land regulation at the end of the simulation.  
Moreover the plurality of local community regulators’ logics of action for managing their respective 
territories seems to favor a longer time a pluralism of land regulation whereas the expression of the 
unique logic of action of a State managing by himself the whole environment seems to encourage a 
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more exclusive State land regulation (once user agents decide to mobilize it). The overall comparison 
of the left and right columns of the figures A to D shows indeed that the final levels of the probes are 
reached more rapidly when only the State regulation is introduced, and that the values of these final 
levels are higher.  
Finally, the fact of introducing the new land regulation source with a variable intensity (as the 
proportion of users mobilizing this new land regulation source on a same area) (Figure B and D) or a 
variable configuration (Figure A and C) (as the spatial distribution of the users mobilizing the new land 
regulation source) does not seem to influence the results, the trend of the observed probes are broadly 
similar.  
All of these results are linked to the fact that users have specific and diversify perceptions on the 
resources that surrondind them and on the sources of land regulation that predominantly managing 
it. A secund set of simulation scenarios has been developped to test the significance of this particular 
parameter on the potential of diffusion of a new land regulation source, and on the pluralism of 
regulation observed overall.  
ii. Secund set of simulation scenarios: to explore the dissemination of new land 
regulation source(s) according to users ‘perceptions 
For this set of simulation scenarios, we fixed the values of intensity and configuration of the new land 
regulation source introduction patterns. Each new regulation is introduced in the agent-based model 
with an intensity (per land plot) of 30 fictive new users, on a 20 land plots distribution. This calibration 
result from the first set of scenario simulations (see above) on the introduction pattern analysis.  
On this basis, as same as for the first set of scenarios, we developed two simulation scenarios, one with 
a randomly spread distribution of these new land regulation sources, and one with a contiguously 
localized distribution. This time, the two potential new land regulation sources (state and local 
community regulation) are introduced simultaneously.  
As a reminder, user agents have an attribute “perception of resource regulation”, by default specific 
to each user agent (varying from 1 up to 15 for the INIT B). This reflects the idea that the level of 
information that land actors possess about land regulations strongly vary from one user to another, 
some of them have a perception that only extend on their village, or their land territory whereas others 
will know what is happening in the all country (i.e. the total environment of the agent-based model). 
For this set of simulation scenarios, the diversity of users ‘perceptions is replaced by a progressively 
increasing homogeneous perceptions, starting from 1 (all user agents have their attribute value equal 
to 1) and ending at 30 (all user agents have their attribute value equal to 30) at the end of the 
simulation.  
 
Choice of indicators 
For this set of scenario simulations, we also chose to explore the expression of a pluralism of land 
regulation sources through two series of indicators the evolution of users activities realized with 
resource access rights obtained by these different sources, as same as for the first set of scenarios: 
stateLevel, localCommunityLevel, landChiefLevel, otherUserLevel. 
Results analysis  
Some of the results of the first set of simulation scenarios already showed that the plurality of local 
community regulators logics of action for managing their respective territories seems to favor a longer 
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time a pluralism of land regulation. The current results specify that the pluralism of land regulation is 
also partially linked to the diversity of users ‘perceptions/information asymmetry. For the same 
values of intensity and configuration of introduction pattern, this pluralism of land regulation 
sources express itself longer when the new sources of land regulation are introduced only contiguous 
localized areas.  
Indeed, when the new sources of land regulation appear randomly spread within the environment 
(Figure G), results show that a form of pluralism is possible at the beginning of the simulation, but after 
a few steps, especially if users ‘perceptions are above 10-15, the State become the predominant source 
of regulation for all user agents (G.4), except for some simulations where it is the Local Community 
regulation that predominates (G.2), but it is strictly one or the other, no pluralism is possible). For the 
last two levels of perception (29-30), all the user agents know all the environment in terms of natural 
resources and their regulations, and it seems to induce a total incapacity for the new sources of 
regulation to appear in users ‘practices, they mobilize only the land chief agents (G.7 and G.8) because 
their general initial prevalence at the scale of the whole environment is stronger than the new 
regulation sources intensity of introduction (30 intensity/ 20 distribution). This unique mobilization of 
land chief agents also seems to reduce the number of users who actually access to resources, because 
all users ask to the same land chiefs (because they want to reach the same quality of resources, and 
so on the same land plots…)).   
When the new sources of land regulation are introduced on contiguous localized areas (Figure H), the 
pluralism is allowed until the end of the simulation, and the local community sources (H.1 and H.2) 
seems to disseminate and stabilize more effectively where the State regulation tend to disappear after 
a few steps (H.3 and H.4). No new sources of regulation are maintained in users ‘practices before the 
latter reach a level of perception equal minimum to 14-15.  Between a 16-26 level of perception, local 
communities are the predominant source of regulation for all the user agents (H.2), and the land chief 
regulation reach its lower level (H.8), but this level increase again when users ‘perceptions are high 
(29-30) and finish at the end of the simulation at a higher level than when the new sources appear 
randomly.  
All these scenarios has been simulated to the space scale of INIT B, but the agent-based model allows 
the possibility of choosing two complementary scales of analysis in order to complete the exploration 
of a pluralism of land regulation (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1: complementary set of simulations in order to explore the diffusion of new land regulation 
source(s) according to the space scale of the agent-based model 
For this set of simulation scenarios, we fixed the perceptions of user agents, as plural and specific to 
each user agent, randomly chosen (between 1 and 15) at the initialization of the model, and we also 
fixed the introduction pattern of the new land regulation source. Each new regulation is introduced in 
the agent-based model with an intensity (per land plot) of 30 and a 30 land plots distribution. We then 
developed two simulation scenarios, one with only the State new regulation introduced (see attached 
Figure E) and one with only the Local Community new regulation introduced (see attached Figure E) 





For the same values of intensity and configuration of new regulation introduction pattern on the three 
space scales, the diffusion of the new source is general on the INIT A (land plot size = 1 ha), no matter 
the characteristics of the introduction pattern (randomly spread of contiguously localized, through the 
State or the local community agents). While these characteristics play a role on the new land regulation 
source diffusion at the scales of INIT B (land plot size = 50 ha) and INIT C (land plot size = 1000 ha).   
Indeed, when the new source appears randomly in the environment, the diffusion mainly becomes 
total whereas when the new regulation source is localized it only concerned at the most one fifth of 
the users’ rural activities. The impact of these new sources of land regulation on the initial traditional 
regulation through land chief agents is significant at the scale of INIT A (the level of users ‘rural 
activities that mobilize land chiefs for accessing resources tend to be reduced to a minimum). At the 









6. ATTACHED FIGURES 
ATTACHED FIGURE 1 
Scenario of consistency Test One: only good annual rainfall 
Cormas 
Indicator 




































































1.4 Evolution of the quantity of fodder available on the land plots over time 
  













































ATTACHED FIGURE 2 
Scenario of consistency Test Two: only seasonal resource access rights distributed by land regulators 


















2.2 Evolution of the number of land plots concerned with ongoing user resource access rights over time 
  















































ATTACHED FIGURE 3 
Scenario of consistency Test Three: only social priority logics of action for water and land regulators 







3.1 Evolution of the number of user agents with resource access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  


























































3.3 Evolution of the number of user agents with water access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  

















































3.5 Evolution of the quantity of water available in the drillings over time 
  


















































   
 
ATTACHED FIGURE 4 
Scenario of consistency Test Four: only environmental conservation priority logics of action for water and land regulators on an environment only composed of 
fertile lowlands 






































































4.3 Evolution of the number of user agents with water access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  




















































4.5 Evolution of the quantity of water available in the drillings over time 
  























































ATTACHED FIGURE 5 
Scenario of consistency Test Five: only environmental restoration priority logics of action for water and land regulators on an environment only composed of 
degraded soils 



















































5.3 Evolution of the number of user agents with water access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  




















































5.5 Evolution of the quantity of water available in the drillings over time 
  























































ATTACHED FIGURE 6 
Scenario of consistency Test Six: only economic priority logics of action for water and land regulators, with only high water and land access prices 







6.1 Evolution of the number of user agents with resource access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  





























































6.3 Evolution of the number of user agents with water access right(s) in their portfolio over time 
  





















































6.5 Evolution of the quantity of water available in the drillings over time 
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ATTACHED FIGURE A 
FIGURE A  
Randomly spread introduction pattern of a fixed intensity and a variable distribution of a new land regulation 
PANEL 1 : comparison of the diffusion of the State and Local Community new land regulations on the user agents rural activities 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through state 
resource access rights 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through local 
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PANEL 2: impact of these new land regulations introduction patterns on the initial traditional land chief regulation 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
resource access rights when a new State land regulation is introduced 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
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ATTACHED FIGURE B 
FIGURE B 
Randomly spread introduction pattern of a fixed distribution and a variable intensity of a new land regulation 
PANEL 1 : comparison of the diffusion of the State and Local Community new land regulations on the user agents rural activities 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through state 
resource access rights 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through local 
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PANEL 2: impact of these new land regulations introduction patterns on the initial traditional land chief regulation 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
resource access rights when a new State land regulation is introduced 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
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ATTACHED FIGURE C 
FIGURE C 
Contiguous-localized introduction pattern of a fixed intensity and a variable distribution of a new land regulation 
PANEL 1 : comparison of the diffusion of the State and Local Community new land regulations on the user agents rural activities 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through state 
resource access rights 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through local 
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PANEL 2: impact of these new land regulations introduction patterns on the initial traditional land chief regulation 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
resource access rights when a new State land regulation is introduced 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 



























0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
78 
 
ATTACHED FIGURE D 
FIGURE D 
Contiguous-localized introduction pattern of a fixed distribution and a variable intensity of a new land regulation 
PANEL 1 : comparison of the diffusion of the State and Local Community new land regulations on the user agents rural activities 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through state 
resource access rights 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through local 
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PANEL 2: impact of these new land regulations introduction patterns on the initial traditional land chief regulation 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
resource access rights when a new State land regulation is introduced 
Level of rural activities initiated by user agents over time through land chief 
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ATTACHED FIGURE E 
FIGURE E: STATE NEW LAND REGULATION INTRODUCTION 
INIT INIT A (land plot = 1 ha) INIT B (land plot = 50 ha) INIT C (land plot = 1000 ha) 






   
LEGEN
D 
Probe color violet/blue = no new land regulation introduced // Probe color red = randomly spread introduction of the State new land regulation source //Probe color 
orange = contiguously localized introduction of the State new land regulation source 
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LOCAL COMMUNITY NEW LAND REGULATION INTRODUCTION 
INIT INIT A (land plot = 1 ha) INIT B (land plot = 50 ha) INIT C (land plot = 1000 ha) 








   
LEGEND Probe color violet/blue = no new land regulation introduced 
Probe color red = randomly spread introduction of the State new land regulation source 
Probe color orange = contiguously localized introduction of the State new land regulation source 
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ATTACHED FIGURE G 
SIMULTANEOUS RANDOMLY SPREAD INTRODUCTION OF THREE NEW LAND REGULATION SOURCES (INTENSITY VALUE: 
30, NUMBER OF CONCERNED LAND PLOTS: 20) 
G.1 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by local community agents, according to the value 
































G.2 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by local community agents, according to the value 



































G.3 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by the State agent, according to the value of user 






























G.4 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by the State agent, according to the value of user 





























G.5 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by user-regulator agents, according to the value of 



































G.6 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by user-regulator agents, according to the value of 






























G.7 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by land chief agents, according to the value of user 


































G.8 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by land chief agents, according to the value of user 

































SIMULTANEOUS CONTIGUOUSLY-LOCALIZED INTRODUCTION OF THREE NEW LAND REGULATION SOURCES (INTENSITY 
VALUE: 30, NUMBER OF CONCERNED LAND PLOTS: 20) 
H.1 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by local community agents, according to the value 
































H.2 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by local community agents, according to the value 



































H.3 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by the State agent, according to the value of user 






























H.4 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by the State agent, according to the value of user 




H.5 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by user-regulator agents, according to the value of 






























H.6 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by user-regulator agents, according to the value of 




























H.7 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by land chief agents, according to the value of user 































H.8 Number of activities realized by user agents through resource access rights delivered by land chief agents, according to the value of user 
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